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Our doctoral dissertation is divided into 10 thematically organized parts. As the 
history of Yemen is said to be an unknown part of the Hungarian scholarly litera-
ture we do not only focus on the relationship with the socialist countries. We 
think that the history of the background is indispensable for a thorough analysis 
of this difficult and complex relationship. In accordance with this we paid atten-
tion to the important events of Yemen's internal policy as well as its international 
consequences. 
In the first chapter the detailed history of the Arab monarchy was presented. 
Within the framework of this period we outlined the social division of Yemen, 
the power of the monarchy, the hopeless economic conditions as well as the un-
developed education system and healthcare. In this context we came to the con-
clusion that the backwardness of the conservative regime gave lots of chances for 
the socialist countries to exercise influence in the country. 
We also devoted a significant part to presenting the opposition movements, 
which appeared with the claim to reform or even overthrow the political system. 
Their birth can be dated from the defeat by Saudi Arabia in 1934. At that time 
their aim was only to change the regime with peaceful means. However, they 
started to radicalize due to the dynastical crisis, the experience of the students 
who studied abroad and as a result of the ideas of Arab nationalism. Following 
from this it can be concluded that the revolution of September, 1962 was bound 
to happen. Only the time of it remained uncertain. 
In the second unit of our work we studied the relationship between the Yem-
en monarchy and the socialist countries. Two periods can be separated themati-
cally. The first, almost 10-year-long period started in 1928 when the Soviet-
Yemen relations became official. The reason behind it can be found in their mu-
tual dependence. In connection with this we reflected on Yahja imam's most im-
portant aim in foreign policy after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, namely the res-
toration of Great-Yemen. However, the southern part of the country was under 
the supervision of Great Britain. With this Britain wanted to secure the sea routes 
to India and the oil concerns. Because of the limited resources the monarch of 
Yemen was not able to oppose the British effectively in the evolving confronta-
tion. In this situation he needed to ask for foreign support. The Soviet Union was 
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said to be an attractive version from different points of view. Besides compensat-
ing for the Italian influence in Yemen, the Soviets had a perfect anti-imperialistic 
policy; moreover the geographical distance could prevent this power from be-
coming involved in internal politics. 
For Yemen's request Moscow's answer was positive. It started to make an at-
tempt to create an economic influence in the Persian Gulf or in East-Africa and to 
cooperate with the opposing powers of the Muslim states. 
We wanted to emphasize that it was not only the economic perspectives that 
were important in the Soviet approach to Yemen between the two world wars but 
the imam's efforts against the British and the Italians were also respected. 
In connection with the decline of the relationship we can say that it was 
caused by the Soviet Union's weak economic potential, which could not make the 
maximum use of the advantages possible. Moreover, it was helped by the dy-
namic advance of Italy and Germany, which first lead to the revision of the rela-
tions, then to the reduction of them. It is important to emphasize that the Soviet 
Union was able to keep a distance from the vision of the socialist revolutions all 
around the world by deepening the connection with the totally different system 
of Yemen in its foreign policy. 
There was a new chance in the 1950s to restore the relations. It was due to 
many new conditions, like the Soviet Union's new approach to the Arabic states 
after Stalin's death or the ambition to increase the number of anti-imperialist al-
lies during the cold war. However, in this period not only the Soviet Union could 
renew the connections, but we can also witness the creation of new connections 
with China and the Eastern-European countries. Although the financial assis-
tance to the monarchy and the slow modernization of the army and infrastruc-
ture did not help China deepen the relations. Besides talking about the details of 
the aids we discussed the spread of Arab nationalism, which seemed to be the 
biggest obstacle of the socialist influence. We stated that their support was only 
necessary as long as the imam could use it for his national interests. The fall of 
the United Arab States and Cairo's action against the monarchy had serious ef-
fects on these slowly progressing relations inasmuch as the sovereign decided to 
close it radically for the protection of his system. 
There was a similar chance for the creation of the Hungarian-Yemeni connec-
tions, which was analyzed in the third chapter. We stressed that the most im-
portant reason for that was to break out from the isolation on the stage of the 
Hungarian foreign policy after the events of the 1956 revolution. Because of our 
country's geographical and financial conditions it was not able to and did not 
even want to create strategic goals like Moscow. Similarly to the other socialist 
countries the stress was on widening the commercial relations, which turned out 
to be a failure not even under the monarchy but at the beginning of the republic, 
too. 
In the fourth part of the dissertation the events of the revolution in September, 
1962 are analyzed with the problems of Cairo's interaction and the long process 
of the recognition of the new republic. It can be stated that most of the Arabic re-
publics and the socialist countries accepted the new system of Yemen. The main 
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reason for it was the government's nationalist and socialist attitude, as well as its 
negative standpoint towards the Western camp. Although, the question of 
acknowledgement rose in connection with the inter-Arab conflict soon after the 
involvement of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Great Britain. As a result, the es-
tablishment of the diplomatic connections with the new government of Yemen 
depended on the supporting partners' point of view, and the civil war became 
the substitute for the Arabic cold war. 
In the next chapter the problems of the newly established republic were pre-
sented. The overthrow of the monarchy was not supported unanimously by the 
population. The country became divided into two parts and a civil war began. 
The dragging on of the conflict - in our opinion - was due not only to the inter-
vention of the UAR and Saudi Arabia, but also to the failure of the international 
attempt to solve the problem, as well as to the problems of the formulating re-
public. The socialist countries were determined to keep the political distance with 
the republicans, because they did not want to risk the chance of the western in-
tervention and the breakdown of the balance in the Persian Gulf. Likewise, it was 
ascertained that Saana's direct support was only economic and diplomatic to 
avoid the disturbance of the working relations with Nasser's Egypt. 
From the beginning the socialist countries were adherent to the republican 
system. However, their indirect support was very moderate until 1964, due to the 
Egyptian hegemony in the rule of Saana. The first chance for direct negotiations 
came in the spring of 1964 when Egypt seemed to leave Yemen to itself by liqui-
dating the military presence in the country. In the sixth chapter we presented the 
negotiations of Yemen's delegation in Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Berlin, Bucharest, 
Budapest, and Beijing with special emphasis on the Hungarian visit's results. In 
connection with the negotiations we reached the conclusion that those were suc-
cessful concerning the agreements and support; however in practice they showed 
less efficiency. Commodities were still delivered with Egyptian cooperation. Pres-
ident Sallal could not have himself accepted as the country's sovereign leader, 
and the internal affairs were still led by the UAR's officials. In conclusion, it can 
be said that the conferences could not reach their original aim; therefore they can 
be rated as a failure. 
The period between 1964-1967 was characterized by the different attempts for 
solutions such as the diplomatic and the armed. In the seventh chapter we out-
lined the reasons behind the divided republican side, the process of disorganiza-
tion, the birth of the Jeddah Agreement whose aim was to finish the civil war, 
and the fulfillment of the Egyptian hegemony. From the socialist countries' point 
of view it meant the continuation of the policy toward Yemen, which also met 
with Cairo's interests. In practice it meant the realization of the aid promised in 
the contract of 1964 related to the improvement of the highway system of Yemen, 
as well as the health care and education system. All of it changed only after the 
fall of 1967 when the UAR needed to withdraw its troops from Yemen due to the 
defeat in the Six Day War. 
In the eighth chapter the dynamism of the Hungarian-Yemeni relations was 
presented. After 1964 our country focused on the fulfillment of the assumed obli-
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gation related to the contract of 1964. Besides it helped to deepen the two coun-
tries' relationship. It contained health supply, an economic delegation was sent to 
check the precise demands of Yemen. The number of scholarships between the 
two countries was raised. A Hungarian crew shot a documentary movie about 
the country. The most serious supply was the installment of a public health insti-
tution and its cooperation with the Hungarian staff. It also can be observed that 
there was no high increase in the trade connections after Sallal president's visit in 
Budapest, because the Hungarian partner did not see any hope for that. 
In the ninth part the Six Day War's consequences in Yemen were analyzed. As 
we observed the leadership of UAR could not continue its mission in Yemen due 
to the defeat from Israel. After the Khartoum agreement the UAR gave up its po-
sition in return for the financial support from Saudi Arabia with which it was 
able to recover its damaged economy. After the leaving of the Egyptian forces the 
republican system seemed to break up but due to the socialist countries' sudden 
assistance the main attack of the royalist forces turned out to be a failure. Apart 
from helping in the very critical situations there was no unconditional commit-
ment of the Saana system toward these countries. What is more, the opposite 
happened when the republicans could carry out effective activity toward the clos-
ing of the civil war, making the peace as well as stabilizing their weak foreign re-
lations. As far as the internal affairs were concerned the socialist countries were 
disappointed because of the strengthening right-wing political forces and newly 
revitalized relations with the West in Yemen. Thanks to that the previous started 
to focus on the revolutionary South-Yemen. 
In the last chapter we came to a conclusion that the relationship between 
Hungary and Yemen remained political during our period. In the spirit of soli-
darity our country offered economy aid, scholarship programs, training of ex-
perts and public health assistance. In contrast with the agreement Hungarian 
doctors worked in the hospitals installed by Hungarians. Hungary was open-
minded toward the wide range of necessities of Yemen but it failed due to the ab-
sence of the requested data. As we observed the Hungarians did not expect any 
change related to this, and the sign of the declining relations was the lack of the 
high-level meetings. After this they focused on the Middle East region, where 
they hoped more economic and political advantages. 
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